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THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL
by
Daniel W Shuman* and Richard Hawkins**
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Therapeutic Aspects of Institutional Care
From the development of psychiatric hospitals or institutions in the
United States in the early nineteenth century' until very recently,2 hospi-
talization or institutionalization has been the primary mode of care and
treatment for the mentally ill in public psychiatry. Although the creation
of institutions for the insane and the provision of institutional care was
once viewed as a progressive approach to the care and treatment of the
mentally ill, it is now commonly accepted that alternatives to institutional
care for the mentally ill are frequently more effective than institutional
care, 3 and that institutional care should be used only as a treatment of last
resort.4
The change in attitude towards institutional care is a result of the dis-
covery of the deleterious effects of institutionalization,5 the discovery of
new medications,6 and the development of community based mental
* B.A., J.D., University of Arizona. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University.
** B.A., Gustavus Adolphus College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Washington. Associ-
ate Professor of Sociology, Southern Methodist University.
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for the grant that made this research possible, and to Deborah Fuller for assistance in data
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1. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 130-54 (1971).
2. See A. SCULL, DECARCERATION (1977); Kaplan, State Control of Deviant Behavior
A Critical Essay on Scull's Critique of Community Treatment and Deinstitutionalization, 20
ARIZ. L. REV. 189 (1978). It is not coincidental that the American Psychiatric Association's
predecessor organization was the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Insti-
tutions for the Insane founded in 1844.
3. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, B. DINITZ & B. PASAMANICK, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE NEW
CUSTODIAL COMMUNITY: FIVE YEARS AFTER THE EXPERIMENT (1974); Langsley,
Machotka & Flomenhaft, A voiding MentalHospitaldmissin: .4 Follow-Up Study, 127 AM.
J. PSYCH. 1391, 1394 (1971).
4. Position Statement on Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally I11, 128 AM. J.
PSYCH. 1480, 1480 (1972).
5. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 350 (1961); Mendel, Effect of Length of Hospitalization on
Rate and Quality of Remission from Accute Psychotic Episodes, 143 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 226 (1966). In addition to the dependency fostered by this form of care, most pub-
lic mental hospitals have been overcrowded, underfunded, and inadequately staffed. Cham-
bers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally II." Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1125-50 (1970).
6. Jarvick, The Psycho Pharmacological Revolution, in READINGS IN CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY TODAY 93 (1970).
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health programs and facilities.7 The efficacy of community care is evi-
denced by numerous studies. For example, several studies involving the
treatment of comparable groups of schizophrenics in mental hospitals and
at home show that the schizophrenics treated at home had fewer hospital
readmissions and better mental status than those treated in mental hospi-
tals.8 Day hospitalization,9 adult foster care,' ° half-way houses," and
boarding homes 12 have also been shown effective in the treatment of
mental disorders.
B. The Doctrine of Less Drastic Means
The doctrine of separation of powers,' 3 which allocates the law-making
function to the legislature, carries with it an implicit limitation upon the
judicial power to scrutinize the means the legislature has chosen to resolve
certain societal problems.' 4 Typically, the mere existence of a rational ba-
sis for legislation has been sufficient to limit further judicial inquiry into
the wisdom of that legislative choice.' 5 One exception to this general rule
of limited judicial scrutiny is the doctrine of less drastic means. 6 This
doctrine precludes the government's use of overly broad means of accom-
plishing its valid objectives if the broad approach restricts certain pro-
tected interests and a less drastic means of accomplishing the government's
objective exists.17 The United States Supreme Court has described the
doctrine as follows:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
7. Greenblatt & Glazier, The Phasing Out of Mental Hospitals in the United States, 132
AM. J. PSYCH. 1135 (1975).
8. See A. DAVIS, B. DINITZ & B. PASAMINICK, supra note 3.
9. Herz, Endicott, Spitzer & Mesnikoff, Day Versus Inpatient Hospitalization.- A Con-
trolled Study, 127 AM. J. PSYCH. 1371 (1971).
10. Brook, Cortes, March & Sundberg-Stirling, Community Families. An Alternative to
Psychiatric Hospitalization, 27 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 195 (1976).
11. H. GOTTSFELD, ALTERNATIVES TO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALIZATION 49 (1977).
12. Id at 47.
13. The doctrine of separation of powers contemplates a division of functions between
the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government to avoid the consolidation of
power in any one branch. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
126-27 (1978). For a discussion of the evolution of the separation of powers theory, see
Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV.
385 (1935). See generally A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953). See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
14. "Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in [legislation], it is not for us to say. The
answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as
often, is with power, not with wisdom." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1936) (Jus-
tice Cardozo).
15. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In cases in which the law
infringes on constitutionally protected rights, a stricter scrutiny is applied. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Wexler & Scoville, Special Project-The Administration of Psychiatric Justice. The-
ory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 140 (1971). See also Chambers, supra note
5; Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of The Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of
Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100 (1977); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment
of the Mentally I1, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
17. Wexler & Scoville, supra note 16, at 140.
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governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.
18
Although the Court has not articulated clear guidelines for application of
this doctrine, 9 its application to civil commitment proceedings is compel-
ling.2" Protection of society from the dangerous mentally ill, protection of
the mentally ill from themselves, and the rendition of beneficial treatment
to the mentally ill have been recognized as valid governmental objec-
tives.2 ' If the government seeks to accomplish these objectives through
involuntary hospitalization, it restricts a protected interest, liberty,22 and if
an alternative form of care (e.g., outpatient care) would be as effective23
and less restrictive of the patient's liberty, involuntary hospitalization
should not be permitted.24
The first judicial recognition of the less drastic means doctrine in the
mental health area occurred in Lake v. Cameron,25 a decision of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals authored by Judge David
Bazelon. Mrs. Lake suffered from "senile brain disease" and had been
confined to St. Elizabeth's Hospital because of her inability to care for
herself. In an opinion that reviewed a challenge to her confinement, Judge
Bazelon interpreted the relevant District of Columbia statute to require
judicial exploration and exclusion of less restrictive alternatives as a pre-
requisite to involuntary hospitalization. 26 The opinion indicates that ap-
plication of the less drastic means doctrine in civil commitment
proceedings is supported by the United States Constitution as well as by
the District of Columbia Code.27
Lake was cited by the United States Supreme Court in In re GauIt28 as
support for the "possible duty of a trial court to explore alternatives to
involuntary commitment in a civil proceeding., 29 The Court, however,
subsequently dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the ap-
peal in Sanchez v. New Mexico,30 a case that raised the Lake issue in a
18. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
19. Chambers, supra note 5, at 1145.
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 331 (1979).
22. 99 S. Ct. at 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
23. A. DAVIS, B. DINITZ & B. PASAMANICK, supra note 3.
24. An objective analysis of restrictiveness may be inappropriate. For example, a pa-
tient who requires some form of inpatient care may find the open ward of a state hospital
with large grounds less restrictive of his liberty than a nursing home with closed wards and
no grounds. Because it is the patient's interest in liberty that the doctrine seeks to take into
account, the court's or the expert's notions of restrictiveness must be tempered by the pa-
tient's view. Hoffman & Foust, supra note 16, at 1104.
25. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26. Id at 659-61.
27. Id at 659-60. See also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
28. 387 U.S. I (1967).
29. Id at 28 n.41.
30. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
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constitutional setting. Because the dismissal implies that the Court found
a constitutional question lacking, Sanchez might be interpreted as the de-
mise of the constitutional doctrine of less drastic means in civil commit-
ment proceedings. Nonetheless, numerous subsequent lower federal deci-
sions have found constitutional support for the doctrine in civil
commitment proceedings.3' These decisions recognize that the Court had
previously decided the issues presented in other cases dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question;32 therefore, the precedential value of the
Court's refusal to hear Sanchez is limited.33
Subsequent pronouncements by the Court also suggest that it may be
willing to reexamine the issue at a later date. In Jackson v. Indiana,3 4 for
example, the Court examined the constitutionality of a lengthy commit-
ment for incompetency to stand trial, and noted that "[a]t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
ted.",35 Arguably, if outpatient treatment is the most efficacious mode of
treatment, and the commitment is not to protect society from this patient,
inpatient treatment lacks a reasonable relationship to the purpose for
which the individual was committed.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,36 in the context of a discussion of the right to
liberty, the Court stated that "incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary
condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving
safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends." 37
Standing alone, this statement might be subjected to a variety of interpre-
tations; however, as authority for this proposition the O'Connor Court
cited Shelton v. Tucker,38 a case in which the Court applied the less drastic
means doctrine to protect a teacher's freedom of association. The plaintiff
in She/ion challenged an attempt by Arkansas to discover its teachers' or-
ganizational ties in order to ascertain their fitness as teachers.39 Although
the Court recognized that inquiry into teacher fitness is a legitimate state
goal, it concluded that requiring teachers to disclose all their organiza-
tional ties interfered with a constitutionally protected interest, and that the
state's legitimate goals could be accomplished through narrower or less
31. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 453 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386
F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 414 U.S. 473,
judgment mod(/led on other grounds and reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E. D. Wis. 1974), va-
cated on other grounds and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
32. Eg., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501 (D. Minn. 1974).
33. See Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals.- The Significance of Lim-
ited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972).
34. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
35. Id at 738.
36. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
37. Id. at 575.
38. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
39. Id at 488.
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drastic means.4° The O'Connor Court's reference to Shelton in conjunc-
tion with a statement about avoiding unnecessary incarceration may there-
fore be viewed as another indication of the Court's willingness to consider
application of the less drastic means doctrine in civil commitment proceed-
ings.
Parham v. JR.4 is further evidence of the Court's willingness to apply
this doctrine to commitment proceedings. Parham held that due process
requires only an independent professional review of a child's admission to
a mental hospital rather than an adversarial proceeding.42 One aspect of
the professional review that appeared to weigh heavily in the Court's deci-
sion was the state's attempt to treat children in the community prior to a
mental hospital referral.43 In effect, Georgia required the use of less dras-
tic alternatives, and the Court's opinion may be viewed as another positive
response to the doctrine.
Jackson v. Indiana, O'Connor v. Donaldson, and Parham v. JR. there-
fore indicate that the Supreme Court may be willing to hold that the
doctrine of less drastic means is constitutionally mandated in civil commit-
ment proceedings. The resolution of this constitutional question, however,
need not stall use of the doctrine in civil commitment proceedings. Since
noninstitutional care may be more effective than institutional care in some
cases, common sense dictates that noninstitutional care be ruled out before
the state orders institutional care. Moreover, the use of the least restrictive
form of care offers hope of a workable compromise between opponents
and proponents of civil commitment.' Noninstitutional care, when feasi-
ble, avoids many of the objections that opponents of civil commitment
have made.45 Patients are not confined to large public institutions in con-
ditions that may approximate criminal confinement; their treatment is not
hidden from public scrutiny by removal from the mainstream of society; if
an error in diagnosis or commitment is made, community care is usually
less onerous than the state hospital; and use of community care still per-
40. Id at 486-87. Shelton is one of the cases that has been relied upon by those who
advocate application of the doctrine in civil commitment proceedings. See, e.g., Wexler &
Scoville, supra note 16, at 141.
41. 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979).
42. Id. at 2506, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 121-22.
43. Id at 2500, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 113-14.
44. Chambers, supra note 5, at 1111. See also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW:
A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 43 (1975) ("/77he best remedyfor reducing wholesale involuntary
confinement is good treatment in a decent local facility. (Emphasis original)).
45. One commentator has written:
With few exceptions [public mental hospitals] suffer from woeful understaf-
fing, overcrowding, and physical decay .... Even if states devoted greater
resources to improving hospital care, there are certain dangers to the isolation
of hospitals that improved staffing cannot cure. Nearly all long-term hospital
patients exhibit flatness of response, withdrawal, muteness, and loss of motiva-
tion. Once believed to be part of the degenerative process of mental illness,
these phenomena are now universally accepted-even by public hospital ad-
ministrators-as responses to hospitalization itself superimposed on the diffi-
culties of illness.
Chambers, supra note 5, at 1125-27. See also Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifi-
cations for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968).
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mits the state an effective means of accomplishing its objectives. Thirty-
five states have found either the legal or policy arguments compelling:
twenty state commitment statutes expressly refer to the use of less drastic
alternatives, and another fifteen impliedly refer to the use of less drastic
alternatives.46
Texas is one state that did not wait for litigation to prompt its adoption
of a statute providing for court-ordered alternatives to institutional care.
House Bill 917, introduced in the sixty-fourth session of the Texas Legisla-
ture, was passed without opposition.47 It is codified in section 38(c) of the
Texas Mental Health Code, which became effective September 1, 1975.48
Section 38(c) provides:
If upon the hearing the court finds that the proposed patient is men-
tally ill and requires observation or treatment for his own welfare and
protection or the protection of others but that the required observa-
tion or treatment can be accomplished without commitment to a
mental hospital, the court may order the proposed patient to submit to
other treatment, observation, or care as may be found by the court to
be likely to promote the welfare or protection of the proposed patient
and the protection of others. If the proposed patient fails to fulfill the
terms of the court's order, the court may, on its own motion or on the
motion of any interested party, order that the mentally ill person be
committed as a patient for observation or treatment in a mental hospi-
tal for a period not exceeding 90 days.
Section 38(c) does not, on its face, require the examination or use of the
least restrictive alternative; instead, it states that "the court may order" the
use of alternatives. Furthermore, this section does not provide a time limit
for commitment to an alternative treatment setting, nor does it prescribe
procedures for revocation of a commitment order entered under this sec-
tion. No enumeration of alternatives is contained in the statute. The par-
ties and the court apparently are limited only by their own creativity in
considering alternatives. The statute makes no reference to funding of al-
ternative modes of care, nor is there a provision requiring the alternative
treatment agency to accept a section 38(c) commitment.
The ambiguities of the statute were perhaps intended to allow maximum
flexibility for the judges and to acknowledge the great variation in availa-
bility of alternative resources in different counties. Yet these ambiguities
make it almost impossible to predict the effect that section 38(c) will have
on the civil commitment process in Texas.
The effect of this section is of significant consequence. Although alter-
natives to institutional care have been recognized as viable therapeutic
46. Hoffman & Foust, supra note 16, at 1113 nn.48 & 49.
47. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 209, § 1, at 486. Interview with Rep. John W. Bryant,
sponsor of H.B. 917, Sept. 26, 1979, Dallas, Texas. The bill was introduced at the request of
a probate judge who concluded that the then existing statutes provided him with insufficient
flexibility in civil commitment proceedings. Telephone interview with Judge David Jack-
son, Sept. 27, 1979, Dallas, Texas.
48. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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choices,49 there is evidence that as many as half the people who are con-
fined to state hospitals could be effectively treated elsewhere.5" Is this in-
appropriate placement in whole or in part a result of the failure to adopt
and apply the less drastic means doctrine to civil commitment proceed-
ings? Is the time and expense entailed in litigation or lobbying for the
doctrine justified? Or is adoption of the doctrine only a hollow promise of
community mental health care? The following study, funded by the Hogg
Foundation for Mental Health, is a first step in ascertaining the impact of
section 38(c).
C. The Study
The study was an empirical one, partially based on first-hand observa-
tion of actual commitment proceedings controlled by section 38(c). The
first part of the study involved a detailed examination of the commitment
process in Dallas County, Texas. After receiving permission from the
judge who is assigned primary responsibility for the civil commitment
docket, 51 we attended all commitment hearings scheduled during a ten-
week period in the summer of 1979.52 In addition to observing these hear-
ings, we conducted extensive interviews with judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, social workers, psychiatrists, and other mental health personnel
involved in the commitment process.
5 3
Because commitment procedures and the availability of alternatives to
hospitalization might vary with the size of the county, the study attempted
to examine the application of section 38(c) in intermediate-sized counties
and small, rural counties as well as in Dallas County. Given demographic
details of proximate Texas counties, summarized in Appendix A, we se-
lected one intermediate-sized county (Collin County) and one rural county
(Hunt County) as representative. Hearings were attended in each of these
counties54 and interviews were conducted with key personnel, as in Dallas
County. The second part of the study involved a comparison of the use of
alternatives in these three counties. While this sample of counties was not
49. See notes 5, 6, 8-12 supra.
50. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D.D.C. 1975); THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL IS-
SUES 10 (1978); Pokornoy & Frazier, Texas Surveys Its Mental Hospital Population, 19
HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 88 (1968) (over one-half of patients in Texas state hospi-
tals could be more suitably treated elsewhere). See also Contemporary Studies Project.- Facts
and Fallacies About lowa Civil Commitment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 895, 975 (1970).
51. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
52. During the 10-week period, 418 civil commitment proceedings were brought before
the court.
53. To encourage candor in the interviews, interviewees were promised that statements
would not be attributed to them in the report of the study. Accordingly, specific interviews
will not be cited in the description of the study.
54. Permission to attend the hearings was obtained from the judges involved. Fewer
hearings occurred in these two counties than was anticipated. Five hearings were held dur-
ing the 10-week observational period in Hunt County, and three were held in Collin County.
Descriptions of each county's mental health system therefore depend mainly on interviews
with key personnel as well as a sample of past records of commitment hearings.
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designed to be representative of the whole state, it does offer insight into
the use of section 38(c) in counties of different sizes and resources.
A third and final part of the investigation involved an assessment of the
legal impact of the statutory change. Did the passage of section 38(c) in
1975 make any significant difference in the commitment process? In order
to answer this question, We secured judicial permission 55 to sample and
review the mental illness case records of each county court for the three-
year period prior to the enactment of section 38(c) (1972-1974).56 These
data were compared to court dispositions for a post-enactment period
(1976-1978). Utilizing aspects of the three methodologies of legal impact
studies, 57 we attempted to trace the effect of the statutory change for each
of the three counties.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCESS IN
TEXAS
The Texas Mental Health Code authorizes involuntary commitment for
both temporary and indefinite hospitalization. 58 Although there is an ad-
ditional substantive requirement for indefinite hospitalization not found in
55. Case records are "public records of a private nature"; therefore, they may be "used,
inspected, or copied only by a written order" of a judge affiliated with the records. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-12a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
56. In Collin County, every third case was sampled beginning with a randomly selected
number between one and three. This technique resulted in a sample of 100 cases. In Hunt
County, a similar random-start procedure was used, resulting in a sample of 147 cases. In
Dallas the total number of cases for each year was computed; an interval was then selected
for each year that would yield fifty cases per year for the sample. Once the interval was
selected, (e.g., every seventeenth case), a random number between one and seventeen was
used to designate the first case. By this method, a sample of 298 cases was drawn from
Dallas County.
57. A legal impact study represents an attempt to ascertain how a particular law
affects the conduct and attitudes of those individuals, groups or other relevant
units located in jurisdictions where that law is in force. By its very nature such
a study involves one essential comparison; the comparison between actual be-
havior patterns in jurisdictions having the law in question and the behavior
patterns which would have existed in those same jurisdictions had the law in
question never been enacted.
There are three ways in which this comparison can be achieved. One is by
comparing the same jurisdiction before and after the passage of the law in
question and noting any behavioral changes which seem to have followed as a
result of the passage of the law. The second is by comparing jurisdictions
which have a particular law with those that do not and assuming that, if not
for the law, behavior in the two sets ofjurisdictions would have been the same.
The third method is by combining the two approaches. This involves examin-
ing behavior patterns in a particular set ofjurisdictions both before and after
they passed the law in question and comparing these patterns with those found
over the same period of time in a set of jurisdictions not having the law in
question.
Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study. The Control of Plausible
Rival Hypotheses, I LAW & Soc'Y REV. 111,111-12 (1966).
58. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-31, -40 (Vernon Supp. 1980). For a de-
tailed description of the Code's operation, see M. ROSENTHAL, INTERPRETATION OF THE
MENTAL HEALTH CODE (5th ed. 1976), published by the Hogg Foundation for Mental
Health.
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temporary hospitalization,5 9 the applicable procedures do not vary in any
substantial way. As we observed no use of indefinite hospitalization dur-
ing our study, this overview will focus on temporary hospitalization.
Proceedings for temporary hospitalization are commenced by the filing
of an Application for Temporary Hospitalization with the county court of
the county in which "the proposed patient resides or is found."6 This
application must allege that there are no criminal charges pending against
the proposed patient, or that proceedings under criminal charges are being
held in abeyance due to the incompetence of the proposed patient to stand
trial.6 It must also allege that the proposed patient is mentally ill and
requires treatment or observation in a mental hospital to protect the pa-
tient or others.62 If two Certificates of Medical Examination for Mental
Illness are not filed with the application, the court is required to appoint
two physicians to examine the proposed patient and submit certificates to
the court; no hearing on the application may be held until the two certifi-
cates have been filed.63 The certificates must state that both physicians
have examined the proposed patient during the past five days and con-
cluded that the proposed patient is "mentally ill and requires observation
and/or treatment in a mental hospital."'
Although the Code does not require that proposed patients be confined
prior to the hearing,65 procedures for pre-hearing confinement do exist. A
magistrate may issue a mental illness warrant authorizing a twenty-four
hour detention of a proposed patient if the magistrate concludes that the
proposed patient is mentally ill and is likely to injure himself or others
unless immediately restrained. 66 Thereafter, the court may authorize con-
tinued confinement pending the hearing.67 The hearing must be held
within fourteen days of the filing of the application, and the proposed pa-
tient must be served with a copy of the application and notice of the hear-
ing.68 If the proposed patient does not have an attorney representing him,
the court is required to appoint one for him at the time the application is
filed.6 9
59. Indefinite hospitalization requires, in addition to the requirements for temporary
hospitalization, that the proposed patient have been the recipient of care in a mental hospital
for at least 60 days within the 12 months preceding the institution of proceedings for indefi-
nite hospitalization. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-40 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
60. Id art. 5547-31.
61. Id This requirement has its origin in the constitutional provision stating that "the
Legislature may provide for the temporary commitment . . . of mentally ill persons not
charged with a criminal offense, for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days." TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 15.
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
63. Id. art. 5547-32 (Vernon 1958).
64. Id art. 5547-32(a).
65. Id art. 5547-35.
66. Id art. 5547-27(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
67. Id. art. 5547-27(a).
68. Id art. 5547-33 (Vernon 1958). Notice must also be sent to the proposed patient's
guardian or responsible relative, id, but such notice is not a substitute for notice to the
proposed patient. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
69. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-33 (Vernon 1958).
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The hearing may be held'at any suitable place within the county.70 Rep-
resentation of the state in these proceedings is the obligation of the county
attorney or district attorney. 7 ' Following presentation of the evidence by
the state and the proposed patient, the court is required by statute to de-
cide whether the proposed patient is mentally ill and in need of observa-
tion and/or treatment for his own welfare and protection or for the
protection of others.72 The Texas Supreme Court addressed these provi-
sions in State v. Turner,73 concluding that a patient confined under the
Texas Mental Health Code is "entitled to treatment, to periodic and recur-
rent review of his mental condition, and to release at such time as he no
longer presents a danger to himself or others."74 A patient entitled to re-
lease from involuntary hospitalization is, by definition, not subject to in-
voluntary hospitalization; thus, this statement by the Turner court
describes the criteria for initial involuntary hospitalization as well as for
release from confinement.
The Code requirement that the proposed patient require observation or
treatment must therefore be interpreted in light of Turner's affirmative
statement that an involuntarily committed patient is entitled to treatment.
The committing court must therefore conclude not only that the proposed
patient requires treatment, but also that he is likely to receive the treatment
he requires if committed. Additionally, Turner states that release must oc-
cur when the patient is no longer dangerous to himself or others.75 If a
patient must be released when not dangerous, implicitly he cannot be com-
mitted if not dangerous. Thus, the statutory requirement that treatment be
necessary for the patient's protection and the protection of others must be
interpreted in conjunction with Turner to require a finding of danger to
self or to others to justify commitment.
Accordingly, before a court in Texas may commit a person it must con-
clude that the proposed patient is mentally ill, requires treatment for his
mental illness, is likely to receive this treatment if committed, and, in the
absence of commitment, would pose a danger to himself or to others. Fail-
ure to satisfy these criteria requires dismissal of the application. If these
criteria are met in a particular case, the court must then decide whether
treatment can be accomplished in a setting other than a mental hospital; if
so, the alternative form of care may be ordered under the authority of
section 38(c).
70. Id. art. 5547-36(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
71. Id art. 5547-13 (Vernon 1958). Note that there is some confusion whether this
provision is still in effect. The Texas Legislature attempted to repeal this provision in 1967,
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 680, § 2, at 1785, but the attorney general ruled that the attempted
repeal was ineffective. TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. M-135 (1967).
72. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(b) (Vernon 1958).
73. 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977).
74. Id at 566. A federal court has also concluded that the Texas Mental Health Code
must be interpreted to require a finding of dangerousness as a prerequisite to commitment if
it is to survive constitutional scrutiny. Reynolds v. Sheldon, 404 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (N.D.
Tex. 1975).
75. 556 S.W.2d at 566.
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III. DALLAS COUNTY
Dallas County, Texas, is an urban community inhabited by nearly one
and a half million people.76 When one of these people experiences serious
behavioral problems and does not seek treatment voluntarily, friends and
relatives of the person may seek to use the coercive powers of the law to
compel the person to accept treatment. In Dallas County this process fre-
quently begins with a visit to Probate Court No. 3, designated as the
"mental illness court." After completion of an application for temporary
hospitalization," provided by the court, the person seeking to institute the
commitment process is interviewed by one of the members of the court's
screening staff whose job it is to determine whether, based upon the infor-
mation presented by this applicant, the prospective patient is an appropri-
ate candidate for the civil commitment system. In addition to the formal
review under the statutory criteria, the mental health screening staff may
also discuss alternative approaches to the patient's problems. Following
this interview, the screening staff presents the application and staff recom-
mendations to one of the probate judges. Generally, the staff recommen-
dation is followed.7" Unless the staff recommends that the proposed
patient be screened out of the commitment process, the judge usually signs
a mental illness warrant directing the sheriff to take the proposed patient
into custody and deliver him to Parkland Hospital for examination by the
emergency room psychiatric staff.
Parkland Hospital is a public hospital operating under the authority of
the Dallas County Commissioners. The hospital has eighteen psychiatric
beds that are primarily used for volunteer teaching-case patients under the
care of members of the Southwestern Medical School Psychiatry Depart-
ment. The psychiatric emergency room staff consists of three social work-
ers from Dallas County Mental Health Mental Retardation Center and the
psychiatric staff from the hospital.
Prospective patients may arrive in the Parkland Hospital emergency
room psychiatric section other than by means of a mental illness warrant.
Lacking knowledge of the formal application process or the time to utilize
it, the patient's family or friends or law enforcement authorities may bring
the proposed patient to Parkland Hospital for assistance with the patient's
behavior. A person may also seek assistance for his own behavioral or
medical problems. The Texas Mental Health Code does not permit the
involuntary detention of a proposed patient absent a mental illness war-
rant, however.79 Accordingly, if the psychiatric staff of the hospital con-
cludes that discharge of a particular patient would pose a serious risk to
the patient or the community and the patient does not concur, and no
mental illness warrant has yet been issued, the staff is often in the tenuous
76. In 1976 Dallas County's population was estimated to be 1,449,496. One percent of
the county's population lives in rural areas. See Appendix A.
77. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
78. One of the judges explained that when he suspects ulterior motives of the family the
staff recommendation for continued processing of the case may not be followed.
79. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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position of trying to keep the patient in the hospital while the patient's
friends or relatives proceed downtown to begin the formal application to
the mental illness court. Sometimes the application is completed in time;
other times frustrated staff must watch a dangerously disturbed individual
walk out of the hospital."
When the patient has been brought to the hospital under the authority
of a mental illness warrant, or one is obtained in a timely fashion, the
emergency room staff views initial screening for alternatives to commit-
ment as one of its goals. If, in the opinion of the emergency room staff,
alternative treatment is not feasible and an initial examination of the pa-
tient supports the conclusion that the statutory criteria for hospitalization
are satisfied, the patient is sent to the Medical Diagnostic Center at the
Hillside Center.8 '
The Hillside Center, previously the Beverly Hills Hospital, was leased
by Dallas County Mental Health Mental Retardation Center in January
1978 for adult in-patient mental health services. Dallas County Mental
Health Mental Retardation Center has contracted with Dallas County to
operate a sixty-bed Medical Diagnostic Center at Hillside; this center con-
ducts the diagnostic activities in the commitment proceedings. The diag-
nostic activities of the center consist of a multidisciplinary approach that
combines the input of social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. The
social workers are expected to contact the family and examine the facts
underlying commitment. This investigation must be completed prior to
the staff meetings that are held on the Monday and Wednesday preceding
the Tuesday and Thursday commitment hearings. Because of the desire to
maximize the use of the Medical Diagnostic Center beds, patients arriving
between Tuesday and Friday will be discussed at the staff meetings on
Monday; patients arriving between Saturday and Monday will be dis-
cussed on Wednesday.
The responsibility to investigate alternatives typically falls upon the so-
cial workers because of their knowledge of the alternatives. Time pres-
sures to prepare for the staff meetings and subsequent hearings, along with
caseload demands, however, may make it difficult for the social workers to
engage in a complete investigation of alternatives.
The psychological staff administers standard psychological tests82 and
80. For a discussion of a similar problem in another state and a proposed solution, see
Shuman, Hegland & Wexler, Arizona's Mental Health Services Act. An Overview and an
Analysis of Proposed Amendments, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 313, 327 (1977).
81. For a variety of reasons, largely budgetary, the number of fully staffed beds avail-
able at the Medical Diagnostic Center fluctuated during the period of our observation. The
number of patients determined by Parkland to need further observation at the Medical Di-
agnostic Center fluctuated in harmony with the center's bed availability. Parkland's floating
standards would appear to be an example of Roemer's Law that health care services utiliza-
tion increases as a function of availability and not necessarily of need.
82. During the second quarter of 1979, for example, 69% of all patients admitted to the
Medical Diagnostic Center received standard psychological tests. "The remainder were in-
sufficiently stable to receive standard testing." Report on Operations of Medical Diagnostic
Center, April 1, 1979 to June 30, 1979 (unpublished report by Dallas County Mental Health
& Mental Retardation Center, Dallas, Texas).
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the psychiatric staff conducts mental status examinations. These different
perspectives are combined at the staff meetings that occur on the day pre-
ceding the hearing. At the meeting each discipline provides a short
statement of its findings and recommendations, if any. Although all par-
ticipants are permitted to question the others, regardless of rank, we ob-
served no rigorous exploration of alternatives in the staff meetings.
Instead, for example, when one social worker stated that alternative A was
not feasible, no one probed the basis for that conclusion or asked about
alternatives B, C, D, or E. The staff meetings result in a consensus recom-
mendation; that recommendation may be that the patient be committed to
Terrell State Hospital, that the patient be discharged and the case dis-
missed, or that some alternative to state hospitalization be utilized. This
recommendation becomes the position of the state at the hearing.
Presentation of the state's case at the hearing falls upon a member of the
Dallas County District Attorney's staff, who is assigned this duty as a part-
time responsibility as a member of the civil section of that office. The
prosecutor plays no role in the staff meetings or recommendations. Typi-
cally, the prosecutor reviews the Medical Diagnostic Center reports and
recommendations on file the afternoon before the hearing and then
presents the state's case at the hearing. In those instances when the Center
has recommended dismissal, the prosecutor will generally move that the
court dismiss the case. When dismissal has not been recommended and
the parties have not reached agreement, the prosecutor is called upon to
present the state's case. This generally involves a litany of questions di-
rected to the state's psychiatrist in which he is asked for his diagnosis, rec-
ommendation, and prognosis. Occasionally, the prosecutor may also
question the party who filed the application for hospitalization.
The attorneys representing the patients are, with rare exception, ap-
pointed by the court. An attorney wishing to receive these appointments
contacts the mental illness court and is placed on the rotation roster.
When the attorney's name comes up in the rotation, usually two or three
times a year, he is assigned one-half the Tuesday/Thursday docket for a
particular week. This assignment may entail between twenty and thirty
cases for the week. The compensation to the attorney for his services is a
flat twenty-five dollars per case.83
The typical court-appointed attorney84 in this process is a young male in
a solo or small practice who handles commitment cases to help pay the
rent as his practice gets started. Although some of the attorneys specialize
in one area of the law, such as criminal or probate, the majority have a
general practice and lack expertise in mental health law or psychiatry. The
majority had not taken psychology or sociology courses, and those who
83. Twenty-five dollars per case is the lowest amount of reimbursement permitted by
the Code; no maximum amount is specified. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-15
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
84. This composite of court-appointed attorneys is based upon our observations and
interviews with eight of the appointed attorneys. These attorneys represent 40% of the court-
appointed attorneys during our observation period.
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had, had taken only one or two basic courses as undergraduate students.
None had taken a law-and-psychiatry or law-and-psychology course in
law school. None had attended continuing legal education courses on
mental health law. And, most surprisingly, one-half of the attorneys inter-
viewed were not even aware of the existence of the Hogg Foundation's
Interpretation of the Mental Health Code85 or Professor Dix's Texas Mental
Health Commitments,86 both of which are keyed to Texas mental health
law.
The appointed attorney's hearing preparation typically began on Mon-
day for the Tuesday hearings and on Wednesday for the Thursday hear-
ings. The pre-hearing activities usually entailed a review of the file at the
court and a trip to the Medical Diagnostic Center to speak with the pa-
tient.87 Only one attorney indicated that he conducted an independent in-
vestigation beyond the file review and patient interview.
The failure of these attorneys to prepare thoroughly for these hearings88
is a function of a number of factors. The notice given the attorney of the
Tuesday/Thursday hearings simply does not permit the attorney the time
to engage in his own investigation of evidence or alternative treatments.
Not until the day before the hearing is the attorney informed which cases
will proceed to hearing. Although the attorney may request a continuance,
he should first secure the approval of his client, who may not consent.
More significantly, the system is designed to provide little incentive for the
attorney to seek a continuance or to engage in a more thorough investiga-
tion. Reimbursement of a flat twenty-five dollars per case suggests that
85. M. ROSENTHAL, supra note 58.
86. G. Dix, TEXAS MENTAL HEALTH COMMITMENTS (1978).
87. This attorney-client contact occurred under less than ideal circumstances. The at-
torneys were generally not provided a private interviewing area. Thus, in order to commu-
nicate effectively with their client in a corner of the ward, they had to contend with their
client's behavioral problems as well as with the remainin& patients in the ward, who fre-
quently interjected themselves into the attorney's communications with his client.
88. One suggested list of activities for the proposed patient's attorney provides as fol-
lows:
Effective representation requires at least the following activities on the part
of counsel. The attorney should make a thorough study of the facts of the
case, which should include court records, hospital records, and information
available from social agencies. Communication with the patient is, in the or-
dinary case, a must. Where such communication is impossible for medical
reasons, the family and friends of the patient should be contacted to ascertain
the true facts behind the petition. It is essential that the attorney have a full
understanding of the events preceding the filing of the petition. An investiga-
tion of the financial condition of the patient and his family-including hospi-
talization insurance-is necessary to determine if certain alternatives to
hospitalization should be explored. Finally, the attorney should explore the
treatment and custodial resources of the community. He should understand
the various services offered by social agencies and the avenues by which these
resources can be applied to meet the needs of his client as alternatives to invol-
untary commitment.
The attorney has a responsibility to consult with the examining physicians
concerning the medical history of the patient, the diagnosis, the proposed
treatment and the prognosis.
Wexler & Scoville, supra note 16, at 56 (footnotes omitted). See also Cohen, The Function of
the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 425, 450 (1966).
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these appointments can be economically justified only if the attorney can
keep his time expenditure to a minimum. Many attorneys perceive an-
other incentive to limit their investigation and resulting in-court presenta-
tion: the majority of attorneys interviewed were of the opinion that the
judges were not interested in overly aggressive, time consuming represen-
tation. Some attorneys thought that an overly aggressive attorney might
not be reappointed; they therefore tempered their investigation and pres-
entation accordingly. Although both judges who heard cases over the
summer stated in interviews that they expected defense attorneys to take
whatever action was necessary to protect the rights of their clients, many of
these attorneys interviewed received a different message.
A. Noncontested Hearings
The mental illness court docket in Dallas consists of contested and non-
contested cases. The noncontested cases are handled summarily and are
designed for those instances when the proposed patient does not wish to
contest the staff recommendations. No evidence is presented in these cases
and the patient is ordinarily not present; his attorney generally represents
the patient's desires to the court. Because the noncontested proceedings
take less time than the contested proceedings,89 there is a financial incen-
tive for the attorney to induce his client to enter a no-contest plea.9" Al-
though we discovered no evidence that attorneys misrepresented the
patient's desires, it is known that the manner in which a question is asked
will affect the answer.9 Thus, the attorney's phrasing of questions-Do
you want help? What do you want to do? They want to send you to the
nuthouse; do you want to go there?-combined with the financial expedi-
ency of noncontested proceedings holds the potential for abuse.
Another potential abuse exists if the attorney is permitted to enter a no-
contest plea without the proposed patient's approval. In some cases the
attorney stated that although the proposed patient did not expressly concur
in the staff recommendations, the attorney concluded that the proposed
patient was so disoriented that treatment would be in his best interest and
the attorney therefore entered a no-contest plea. This procedure is troub-
ling on several grounds. The Mental Health Code does not authorize the
89. Contested cases had a median time of 14 minutes compared to one minute for non-
contested cases.
90. This incentive for no-contest pleas has been noted in other studies. For example,
"[ad litems] were paid a flat fee for each case. That is, their rate of pay depended on the
rapidity with which they could finish." T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL THEORY 137 (1966).
No attorneys we observed or interviewed moved to dismiss the proceedings when his cli-
ent stated that he would voluntarily go to the state hospital. There is evidence that hospital
staff perception and response to voluntary patients is better than their perception and re-
sponse to committed patients. Denzin & Spitzer, Patient Entry Patterns in Varied Psychiatric
Settings, 50 MENTAL HYGIENE 257, 261 (1966). Thus, when an attorney's client indicates a
willingness to volunteer, albeit coerced, the attorney should consider an attempt to dismiss
in exchange for voluntary hospitalization.
91. See Loftus & Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony.- The Influence of the Wording of a Ques-
tion, 5 BULL. OF PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 8 (1975).
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attorney to enter a no-contest plea in the absence of his client's consent.
To the contrary, it has long been recognized in Texas that a guardian or
attorney ad litem may not waive his client's substantial rights.92 The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that an adult facing civil commit-
ment is entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to an adversary hearing
to determine the propriety of commitment. At such a hearing the state
must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.9 3 The right to this
adversary hearing is thus a substantial right. Therefore, under existing
Texas doctrine, the guardian or attorney ad litem is not permitted to waive
his client's right to a civil commitment hearing in the absence of the requi-
site waiver by his client.
To waive a constitutional right the United States Supreme Court has
required a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of a known right.94
Thus, in civil commitment proceedings, "[in the absence of a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent waiver, adults facing commitment to mental insti-
tutions are entitled to full and fair adversarial hearing in which the neces-
sity of their commitment is established. . . ,91 If the proposed patient is
so disoriented that he lacks the capacity to waive these rights, the constitu-
tion requires a hearing.96 If the patient is not disoriented and does not
concur with staff recommendations, then a hearing is particularly appro-
priate and a "best interest waiver" by the attorney raises serious ethical
and legal questions. The legislature has determined that the judge, and
not the defense attorney, is to decide the outcome of civil commitment
proceedings. The "best interest waiver" effectively shifts that decision to
the attorney, leaving the judge, in a case where the patient has not indi-
cated a desire to enter a no-contest plea, to rubber stamp the attorney's
decision to commit his client.
92. Reasoner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Lowery v. Berry, 269 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1954). Although
courts in other jurisdictions have permitted a guardian ad litem to waive rights, such as the
attorney-client privilege, of his "incompetent," authority to waive in those instances was
premised upon the guardian ad litem's protection of the interests of the "incompetent" he
was appointed to represent or defend. Thus, in Lietz v. Primock, 84 Ariz. 273, 327 P.2d 288
(1958), a guardian ad litem appointed by the court to prosecute a fraud claim against the
incompetent's former attorney was permitted to waive the attorney-client privilege so that
the guardian ad litem could depose the defendant in the pursuit of his case. See also Yancy
v. Erman, 99 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio C.P. 1951). Since the guardian ad litem in civil commitment
proceedings is appointed to defend the patient, however, a waiver of this defense is wholly
contrary to these interests. Therefore, implied authority to waive should not be found in this
context.
93. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979).
94. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
95. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2516, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 134 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Occasionally, the patient's attorney indicated at a hearing that the hearing should be
waived and his client committed because the client was not competent to stand trial in the
commitment proceedings. In the context of criminal law, which recognizes the concept of
incompetency to stand trial, a criminal proceeding may be held in abeyance until the de-
fendant is competent and can participate adequately in his defense. The civil commitment
proceedings are not held in abeyance, but rather, because of a concern that the patient could
not participate adequately in his defense, the defense is waived by the lawyer.
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Another facet of the noncontested docket is that it is here where the use
of alternatives to state hospitalization under section 38(c) is revealed. The
Medical Diagnostic Center staff has taken the position that patient cooper-
ation and willingness to seek treatment are prerequisites to nonhospital
care and must be manifested prior to the hearing. Thus, a patient who
maintains at the hearing that he is not committable but that if he is com-
mitted, he would prefer treatment in the community, will not be recom-
mended for a community alternative. There is no statutory requirement
that the patient's option be exercised prior to a finding of committability.
The staff, however, apparently wishes to parcel out its precious alternative
resources only to the most cooperative of patients.
Perhaps the staff believe that the most cooperative patients are most
likely to benefit from alternative treatment. Nonetheless, there is a serious
constitutional question raised by this forced option. The Supreme Court
has recognized that one may not be required to forego one constitutional
right as the cost of asserting another.97 If the right to a hearing and the
right to commitment to the least restrictive alternative are both constitu-
tionally protected,98 a proposed patient may not be forced to waive the
right to the least drastic alternative form of treatment in order to assert the
right to an adversary hearing. Requiring the patient to exercise his option
before the hearing is, therefore, a constitutionally flawed procedure. Al-
though patient cooperation is a legitimate consideration in treatment op-
tions,99 there is no cogent reason for concluding that every proposed
patient who wishes to question his committability at hearing will fail to
cooperate in a particular treatment program if committed. Even so-called
"voluntary" treatment entails an element of coercion." This coercion
may result from personal discomfort with one's own behavior or the threat
of a divorce, job loss, or revocation of a professional license. The threat of
state hospitalization is simply another form of coercion. Therefore, rather
than excluding a prospective patient from a treatment program because his
participation in that program may have been coerced, the decision to ac-
cept the patient in a particular program should be made on a case-by-case
basis, considering factors such as the patient's condition, his response to
particular treatment options, the degree of structure involved in a particu-
lar option, and the likelihood of family support.
B. Contested Hearings
When the patient disagrees with the staff recommendation and no "best
97. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons the defendant's asser-
tion of a search and seizure as a fourth amendment violation required that he admit a pos-
sessory interest in the seized evidence. Id at 390. The government subsequently attempted
to introduce this testimony at trial over the defendant's assertion of his fifth amendment
privile e against self-incrimination. The Court found it "intolerable that one constitutional
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." 1d. at 394.
98. See notes 13-27 supra and accompanying text.
99. See Hoffman & Foust, supra note 16, at 1115.
100. S. HULLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 314 (1967).
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interest waiver" is entered by the patient's attorney, a contested hearing is
conducted. These proceedings typically involve the state's calling the psy-
chiatrist and proceeding through the standard litany of questions. Asking
the psychiatrist for his recommendation frequently evoked a statement
that alternatives to confinement were not feasible.'' If the psychiatrist's
recommendation did not state that alternatives were infeasible, the prose-
cutor frequently asked a specific question about the possibility of alterna-
tive treatment.
Following the direct examination, the patient's attorney conducted
cross-examination of the psychiatrist and often called the patient, who was
examined by his attorney and cross-examined by the prosecutor. Occa-
sionally, the applicant was called by the state or the patient. No other
witnesses typically were involved. The failure of the patient's attorney to
call other witnesses is a function of the factors discussed earlier.' °2 The
short notice of hearing provided does not permit factual investigation and
the issuance of subpoenas for witnesses favorable to the patient. More-
over, no incentive is perceived for this more aggressive representation. It is
thus not surprising that few, if any, attorneys observed utilized a pure legal
method in their representation. The majority of attorneys proceeded in-
stead on a modified medical model or "best interest" approach, 0 3 filtering
the patient's expressed desires through the psychiatrist's opinion of the pa-
tient's needs, or in some instances, modifying this by their own evaluation
of the patient's needs. In numerous instances throughout the study the
patient's attorney actually assisted the prosecutor in committing the patient
by eliciting evidence that supported the commitment the attorney's client
contested.
Even when the psychiatrist's conclusions were inconsistent with or con-
trary to other evidence presented, few defense attorneys probed this incon-
sistency on cross-examination or questioned the basis for the psychiatrist's
unexplained conclusions. The more aggressive attorneys were more likely
to reveal that the psychiatrist had utilized insufficient or incorrect informa-
tion in reaching his conclusions. In these cases, the judge ordered a contin-
uance so that a more accurate and complete factual basis for a decision
101. In all cases that proceeded to hearing, the state psychiatrist recommended hospitali-
zation. In 10% of these cases, however, the psychiatrist revealed that state hospitalization
would not be necessary if a particular alternative was available. In 41% of the cases that
proceeded to hearing, the use of alternatives was never raised during the course of the hear-
ing.
102. See text following note 88 supra.
103. Advocates of the medical model contend that the appropriateness of involuntary
hospitalization is a medical question that should be decided by physicians. See, e.g.,
Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979); Davidson, Mental Hospitals and the
Cipil Liberties Dilemma, 51 MENT. HYGIENE 321 (1967). Although this approach has been
rejected for involuntary hospitalization of adults, Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L.
Ed. 2d 323 (1979), in practice a modified medical approach has frequently been substituted
for the pure legal method of deciding disputes. In this modified medical model the judge
and lawyers assume that the best interests of the prospective patient will be served if the
physician's recommendation, and not the patient's expressed desire, is followed. See Hilday,
Reformed Commitment Procedures." An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, II LAW & Soc.
REV. 651 (1977).
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could be obtained. In many of these instances alternative forms of care
were subsequently agreed upon where none had been thought possible
before.
The overall tenor of the patient representation was manifested in the
fact that no commitment order during the study was appealed although
numerous patients vigorously protested their commitment, nor was any
post-commitment attorney-patient contact disclosed by any attorney. In
no instance did an attorney indicate any attempt to ascertain whether the
treatment promised at hearing was actually provided his client at the hos-
pital, whether release had become appropriate, or whether an alternative
treatment had been successful.
The state's chief witness in the commitment proceedings was a psychia-
trist employed by the Medical Diagnostic Center. To prepare for these
hearings the psychiatrist conducted a mental status examination4 of the
patient and participated in the staff meetings at the Center. At these meet-
ings, based upon inter-disciplinary input, the staff recommendation
emerges that the psychiatrist will proffer at the commitment hearing. Un-
fortunately, the presentation at the hearing rarely involves a detailed
description of the specific treatment needs of the patient, or the specific
treatments available at the state hospital or local in-patient and out-patient
facilities. Further, defense counsel rarely elicits this information on cross-
examination.o 5 Information about alternative treatments is extremely im-
portant, for Texas law requires that the judge decide whether the patient
requires treatment for a mental illness and, if so, where that treatment
should be administered."° If the judge rather than the psychiatrist is to
decide the outcome of the proceedings, then the judge must be provided
with information on the specific treatment needs of the patient and the
specific treatment capabilities of all potential facilities and programs.
Thus, in theory, the judge may expect the state to exclude alternatives to
state hospitalization as an element of its burden of persuasion; in practice,
however, the burden is easily satisfied.
None of the patient's lawyers in the cases observed called a mental
health professional not employed by the state to testify that alternatives
were feasible in a given case. In some instances, however, the judge de-
sired additional professional input and therefore continued the hearing
and entered an order of protective custody °7 directing that the patient be
confined in the state hospital for up to fourteen days and that the state
hospital render a diagnostic report on the patient within that time. The
advantage of this use of the order of protective custody is that the court
obtains additional information on commitment issues without losing its
authority over the patient.
104. Gottlieb, Mental Status Examination, 9 AM. FAM. PHYS. 109 (1974).
105. In only 34% of the contested cases did the defense attorney inquire about alterna-
tives to hospitalization. Others raised the issue in an additional 15% of the cases.
106. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See notes 72-74
supra and accompanying text.
107. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-66, -67 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1980).
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If the judge concludes that the state has already established a prima fa-
cie case and that a commitment order would therefore be entered if an
immediate decision were necessary, the protective custody procedure re-
sembles a short-term commitment for fourteen rather than ninety days,
with the additional requirement that the state hospital report back to the
court. The problem inherent in this approach occurs when the state has
not yet established a prima facie case for commitment and the patient does
not consent to the order of protective custody. Arguably, using the order
in these circumstances is the equivalent of a two-week commitment not
supported by the evidence. Because the state already detained the patient
for up to six days for examination prior to hearing it may be argued that
the state must now prove its case or suffer a dismissal.
Although compelling legal arguments can be advanced against this use
of the order of protective custody, its use is interesting as an attempt to
utilize to the maximum the resources that the system has to offer. This
effort typifies the active role that the judiciary plays in commitment pro-
ceedings in Dallas. One judge has even conducted unannounced site visits
to the Medical Diagnostic Center; these visits resulted in the identification
of a variety of problems in the center and in its immediately addressing
these problems. On another occasion, that same judge subpoenaed a Park-
land Hospital administrator whose actions in a particular case allegedly
contributed to confusion and frustration in the mental health system. In
sum, the judiciary has played an active and creative role in the Dallas
mental health system. While a centralized office to coordinate the many
components of the mental health system in Dallas may be desirable, in its
absence the judiciary has filled the void.
IV. COLLIN COUNTY
Collin County was selected to represent an intermediate-sized county
because of its population of 100,000, forty-percent of which is rural. °8
The situation in Collin County thus illustrates a number of problems of
mental health care in nonurban settings.' 0 9
Concern for mental illness cases appears to be of low priority, and the
system that deals with such cases is born more out of reaction to external
crises rather than rational, planned action. The result is a patchwork sys-
tem. Part of the problem is that there are not enough mental illness cases
being processed through the civil commitment machinery to sustain a via-
ble operation.
There are two different paths to civil commitment for cases arising in
Collin County. The first involves most nonemergency cases. Applications
brought to the court are referred to a mental health worker who serves as a
108. See Appendix A.
109. Only three hearings were held in this county during our summer observation period.
The conclusions in this study are therefore based largely upon information from interviews
with the personnel in the system and on the 100 cases sampled from files of commitment
hearings held between 1974 and 1978.
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screening agent. Cases not screened out at this level are sent to the judge,
who may then execute a mental illness warrant. The proposed patient is
then examined by two physicians and a date is set for a hearing in the
county.
The second procedure, initiated in 1977, is used in emergency cases.
This procedure, operating in the majority of cases, evolved when the com-
munity lost its short-term observation facilities for psychiatric cases. Prior
to 1977, proposed patients were detained locally in the county jail. An
amendment to section 27 of the Mental Health Code precluded the use of
jails for this purpose unless they were "specifically equipped and staffed to
provide psychiatric care and treatment.""'  Following this amendment an
attempt was made to utilize the Collin Memorial Hospital for pre-hearing
detention. The hospital vehemently objected, however, contending that its
existing facility lacked the requisite security for acutely disturbed psychiat-
ric patients and its staff lacked training in the care of such patients.
In an attempt to resolve the ensuing controversy the following procedure
was instituted: A person wishing to institute civil commitment proceedings
signs a Statement of Conduct and/or Circumstances, which is presented to
a magistrate who may then issue a warrant for medical examination. If a
warrant is issued, the patient is then seized and taken by the sheriff to
Collin Memorial Hospital, where a physician examines the patient. If the
physician concludes that the proposed patient is mentally ill, requires
mental hospitalization, and is likely to cause injury if not restrained, the
sheriff takes the patient to the Wichita Falls State Hospital, with a request
for emergency admission."' All subsequent proceedings in the case occur
in Wichita Falls. The judge who hears the case, the lawyers who prosecute
and defend, and the physicians who provide information to the court all
reside in Wichita Falls, which then bills Collin County for these services.
Not all in Collin County have found this compromise procedure a pan-
acea. First, it is alleged, the statutory definition of emergency is often
strained to avoid keeping patients in Collin County who could be cared for
in the Collin Memorial Hospital. 2 Secondly, the Mental Health Code
provides that applications for temporary hospitalization "may be filed in
the county court of the county in which the proposed patient resides or is
found.""' 3 The hearing on this application is to be held "within the
county.""' 4 Compliance with the Code's procedures are obligatory if a
110. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 402, § 1, at 1093 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5547-27(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980)).
111. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
112. An emergency exists when the proposed patient "has symptoms of mental illness
and is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained." Id art.
5547-28(b).
113. Id art. 5547-31. Although the language "may be filed" is permissive rather than
mandatory, the subsequent listing of acceptable places in which applications may be filed
demands an interpretation that an application may be filed in a listed place only, and no-
where else.
114. Id art. 5547-36(a).
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commitment is to be valid.' When, as is typically the case, the patient is
a Collin County resident who was in Collin County at the institution of the
proceedings, the Mental Health Code does not permit a hearing outside
the county. Moreover, even if it is within the power of the patient to waive
this requirement, it is inconceivable that in all cases the patient is pos-
sessed of the requisite capacity to execute a valid waiver and chooses to do
SO. I16
This procedure has other faults. Removal of the commitment proceed-
ings from the community not only places major logistical hurdles in the
path of an effective defense by the patient, but it also effectively destroys
the incentive to utilize Collin County community alternatives. People in
Wichita Falls are not likely to be knowledgeable of the alternatives in Col-
lin County. Moreover, at the time of hearing the patient has already been
removed from the community. Thus, much of the incentive to keep him in
the community has vanished by the time of the hearing. Finally, the emer-
gency procedure bypassed the mental health screening worker, who often
was not informed of the case. In short, the emergency transfer operation in
Collin County resembled banishment of local citizens to another county
system.'' 7 The mental health worker in Collin County resigned during the
period of our observations, partially because of her frustration with this
system. As of this writing we are not aware of her replacement by another
mental health professional.
There were also problems with the nonemergency system. When the
applicant satisfied the judge that a commitment might be appropriate, two
local physicians were appointed to examine the proposed patient. Al-
though two psychiatrists maintain a practice in McKinney, the county seat,
these individuals were reluctant to participate in the commitment process.
Thus, in many instances, psychiatric input into the commitment proceed-
ings is limited or nonexistent.
If the proposed patient is indigent, counsel is appointed by the court and
reimbursed at the rate of $75 per case. Counsel is usually provided two
days' notice of the proceedings, one day longer than in Dallas, and counsel
interviewed in this study perceived no judicially imposed limitation on
their zealousness. Unfortunately, however, the appointed attorneys lacked
any substantial training in psychology, psychiatry, or sociology, had not
taken law school or continuing education mental health law courses, and
appeared unaware of relevant publications keyed to Texas mental health
law. Our discussions and observations suggested that hearing preparation
rarely entailed more than talking with the patient. In no hearing observed
or discussed did the attorney independently investigate or examine wit-
nesses on the subject of less drastic alternatives to hospitalization.
115. Florence v. Crawford, 351 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ).
116. For a discussion of a guardian ad litem's authority to waive rights of his ward, see
note 92 supra.
117. The mental health screening worker who is charged with keeping records of all
commitments stated that the county did not receive a record of the outcome of the initial
proceedings or of the later 90-day commitment hearing at the Wichita Falls Hospital.
1202 [Vol. 33
1980] ALTERNATIVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The failure of defense attorneys to examine witnesses about alternatives
is partially explained by the fact that physicians were not present in any of
the hearings observed. Instead, without a hearsay objection by the pa-
tient's attorney, the physician's conclusory affidavit was received into evi-
dence. l' Physicians, especially psychiatrists, are so reluctant to testify that
many refuse to even examine the patient if they will later be required to
testify. The psychiatrists point out that testifying in court requires them to
cancel appointments. Given the unique problems of private psychiatric
patients, an appointment cancellation may, according to the doctors, result
in the patient's terminating the relationship; these psychiatrists conclude
that such a result is an unacceptable cost of testifying.
The consequence of the physician's absence from the hearing is that his
diagnosis and conclusion cannot be effectively questioned and no inquiry
into his consideration of less drastic alternatives can occur. Unless the
physician tells the court what treatment the patient requires, whether the
patient is dangerous and, if so, in what specific way, what alternative forms
of care have been considered and why they have been rejected, the hearing
is empty formalism. This empty formalism does not meet the require-
ments of the Mental Health Code. When the psychiatrist's conclusions are
not "supported by statements of the behavior on which they are based, the
court does not have sufficient information to make a proper legal determi-
nation of whether the potential harm is great enough to justify depriving
the person of his liberty."" ' 9 The factual data supporting the psychiatrist's
opinions must be shown by the evidence, or the decision to commit will be
the physician's, and not the court's as prescribed by the legislature. 2 °
One of the dangers of this empty formalism was illustrated graphically
in a hearing we observed. A patient diagnosed as psychotic depressive
with alcohol addiction had attempted suicide through an overdose of pre-
scribed medication. The patient was then treated for the overdose at Col-
lin Memorial Hospital. At the subsequent hearing the patient was present
and permitted to roam the court house unattended while another case on
the docket was heard. When his case was called, no live medical or psychi-
atric testimony was received. Based upon the physician's conclusory affi-
davits, the court committed the patient to the state hospital.
Following the hearing we interviewed the director of the Collin County
Mental Health Clinic, an extension of the Wichita Falls State Hospital and
part of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
During the interview, in order to ascertain the type of patients appropriate
for the out-patient care provided at the clinic, we described as a hypotheti-
cal the case of the committed patient whose hearing we had previously
observed. We were told that out-patient care at the clinic would have been
appropriate for this hypothetical patient. The physician's ex parte affidavit
118. For a discussion of the evidentiary and constitutional aspects of this procedure, see
Shuman, The Road to Bedlam. Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 53 (1979).
119. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
120. Id.
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admitted into evidence at the hearing did not explain whether this alterna-
tive form of care had been considered and, if so, why it had been rejected.
Moreover, neither the court nor counsel raised the issue of local alterna-
tives. In essence, the hearing was a mere formality. No careful independ-
ent inquiry by the court occurred; instead, the physician's untested
decision was rubber-stamped by the court.
In sum, the Collin County system of civil commitment is disorganized;
local support facilities such as the community mental health clinic are
largely isolated and underutilized. The judicial procedures observed did
not evidence the exploration of less drastic alternative forms of treatment.
Instead, the county relied heavily on the Wichita Falls State Hospital, lo-
cated a considerable distance from the county. Moreover, cases were often
returned to Collin County by Wichita Falls State Hospital, with little or no
follow up by the Collin County system. Although there were few local
alternative forms of treatment, the existing alternatives were often unrec-
ognized and seldom used to their full potential. Therefore, residents of
Collin County experiencing mental health problems were not likely to re-
main in their community.
V. HUNT COUNTY
Hunt County is a largely rural county located in the geographic area
served by the Terrell State Hospital. 2 ' Its population of 50,000 is served
by mental health facilities located in Greenville, Texas, about seventy
miles northeast of Dallas. 122
An informal system of handling civil commitment cases has developed
in Hunt County, partially because of its size. The county judge is appar-
ently the central figure in the initiation of court action, although a case
occasionally originated at the local community center mental health facili-
ties. These facilities include a Terrell State Hospital Outreach Center with
a staff of psychologists, social workers, and a psychiatrist from Terrell
State Hospital who visited the county two afternoons a week. A second
facility, housed in the same building, was a mental health and mental re-
tardation community mental health center. The outreach center handled
problems referred to them by citizens during the day, and the mental
health and mental retardation facility covered evenings and weekends.
Perhaps one reason the judge was a central figure was that, according to
those interviewed, the local prosecutor disliked handling civil commitment
cases. The local prosecutor actively discouraged initiation of these cases
and avoided involvement in cases that had been filed. In fact, no one from
the prosecutor's staff was at any of the five hearings held during our obser-
vations, and it appears that this is the norm rather than the exception.
121. See Appendix A.
122. Five commitment hearings occurred in this county during our ten-week study pe-
riod. Thus, the description of the mental health system and conclusions about the commit-
ment process are based largely on interviews with key personnel and on observing trends in
commitment cases sampled from a six-year period, 1973 to 1978. See note 56 supra.
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Hampered by the lack of a county in-patient psychiatric facility, Hunt
County, like Collin County, relied upon the state hospital system. The
judge often sent patients on an order of protective custody to Terrell State
Hospital, thirty miles away in Kaufman County, for evaluation. The pro-
cedure differed from Collin County's, however, in that these cases were
returned to the county for hearings on ninety-day commitments.1 23 This
procedure of using an order of protective custody for examination was
partly in response to a lack of facilities at the local hospital, and partly in
response to a lack of local physicians willing to participate in the commit-
ment process. When medical examinations were performed locally, physi-
cians often refused to testify later at the hearings, and their affidavits were
simply accepted into the record. There were no psychiatrists residing in
the county, and most of the physicians used were osteopathic, not allo-
pathic physicians. Although one part-time staff member of the outreach
center was a psychiatrist, he was not used for diagnostic purposes in the
commitment proceedings. Moreover, one physician mentioned in an inter-
view that the second physician often made a diagnosis based on the record
and the diagnosis of the first physician rather than examining the patient
himself. 124
The civil commitment hearings were simply paper signing ceremonies
rather than independent judicial determinations of the propriety of com-
mitment. The patient was not present at any of the five hearings observed;
in each case the applicant and the appointed attorney met in the judge's
chambers for the hearing, which averaged ten minutes. In none of the five
hearings was any alternative raised; the attorney appointed by the court
assumed that hospitalization was best and that local options were not feasi-
ble. Little prehearing investigation occurred. In one hearing observed it
appeared that the patient's appointed attorney had done no pre-hearing
preparation and actually became familiar with the facts of the case during
the hearing. It further appeared that the attorneys lacked expertise in
mental health law as they apparently had not taken traditional courses or
utilized available materials for self-study.
In Hunt County, unlike Collin County, there was a close working rela-
tionship between the judge and the community mental health facilities.
The judge occasionally referred cases to the center for intervention. These
referrals were done informally, rather than as section 38(c) commitments.
Conversely, some cases coming to the center were referred to the court
when local treatment options seemed inappropriate. This informal rela-
tionship between the court and the center was strengthened by the close
ties between Terrell State Hospital and its outreach program in Greenville.
This link, paradoxically, helped the judge justify the heavy reliance upon
123. Collin County patient hearings are generally held in Wichita Falls. See text accom-
panying notes 11-16 supra.
124. Examination by two physicians is required before a commitment hearing may be
had. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-32(a) (Vernon 1958).
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the state hospital for most cases formally brought to his court. Thus, many
citizens received care outside their home county.
VI. TRENDS IN THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO STATE
HOSPITALIZATION
The courtroom observations and interviews on which this study is based
revealed that rural counties rarely considered or used alternatives to state
hospitalization. In Dallas County, however, alternatives to state hospitali-
zation were considered and explored with greater frequency. To deter-
mine whether these observations are representative of the practice in each
county and therefore a valid measure of the impact of section 38(c), we
sampled records of commitment proceedings in each county for the past
six years and recorded case dispositions. The six years sampled included
the three years immediately prior to the passage of section 38(c) and the
three years after its passage. This sample revealed that the statutory
change permitting the judge to commit patients to alternative treatment
resources had no impact in the two rural counties.125 Few alternatives to
state hospitalization were used in the three years prior to enactment of
section 38(c), and few alternatives were used thereafter. One reason for
the lack of impact of section 38(c) in rural counties is the unavailability of
alternatives to hospitalization. The lack of alternatives is only one reason,
however, since alternatives to state hospitalization were seldom considered
at the hearings in Collin and Hunt Counties; in some cases key personnel
in these counties seemed unaware of the availability of local community
alternatives. Thus, instead of utilizing local facilities to the maximum ex-
tent and availing themselves of the unique intangible resources that can be
tapped in a rural community," 6 these counties failed to make the most of
what was available.
Arguably, it may be that the protective and tolerant nature of small
communities means that cases are quite serious by the time they reach offi-
cial attention. If so, perhaps state hospitalization is the only practical al-
ternative in these cases. Although we could not directly measure the
seriousness of the disorders from the information contained in the court
records, those records do include the patient's diagnosis, an indirect indi-
cator of a case's seriousness. Tabulation of the diagnoses of cases in the
commitment system in the three counties reveals that the diagnoses were
roughly equivalent.' 27 In only one category, alcohol and drug abuse
problems, was there a large difference, with Hunt County having a greater
proportion of these cases. Thus, it may be inferred from these similar di-
agnoses that the degree of patient disorder did not vary from county to
county. Moreover, the extensive screening that occurred in Dallas County
should eliminate nonserious cases from the hearing process. Three major
125. See Appendices B & D.
126. See Bachrach, Deinstitutionalization of Mental Health Services in Rural Areas, 28
HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 669 (1977).
127. See Appendix E.
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screening points occurred prior to the hearing: at the warrant stage by the
mental health screening staff and the judge, at Parkland Hospital's psychi-
atric emergency room, and at the Mental Diagnostic Center. The likely
result of this type of screening would be to screen out the less serious cases.
It is therefore unlikely that case seriousness was what prevented the use of
alternatives in rural counties.
In Dallas County, there was a shift in case disposition coincidental with
the passage of section 38(c). State and private hospital commitments in
Dallas dropped from fifty percent of all cases processed in the three years
prior to passage to about thirty-five percent of all cases processed in the
three years after the passage of section 38(c).' 12 Another study of all Dal-
las Mental Diagnostic Center cases from September 1973 to February 1977
found a similar decrease in hospital commitments following the enactment
of section 38(c). 29
Although the passage of section 38(c) coincides with the increased use of
alternatives to state hospitalization in Dallas County, there were other fac-
tors contributing to this trend. Coincidental with the increased use of al-
ternatives was Dallas's acquisition of a new judge assigned to civil
commitment cases. This individual has taken an active role in the mental
health system. Observations of the center meetings and interviews with
participating attorneys indicate that the new judge has played a major role
in shaping the system.
Moreover, shortly after the passage of section 38(c) a mental health
screening staff was established to screen applications for hospitalization at
the warrant stage. Dallas County also recently acquired the use of the
Hillside Center where the Medical Diagnostic Center and other in-patient
psychiatric services are now provided. Although section 38(c) did not re-
quire this acquisition of the Hillside Center or the creation of a screening
service, these occurrences reflect a local attitudinal change occurring at or
shortly after the passage of section 38(c). Through the use of the Hillside
facility, short-term local in-patient psychiatric hospitalization, referred to
as a community services commitment (CSC), can now occur followed by
local out-patient care. If the proposed patient stabilizes sufficiently during
the prehearing observation, community services out-patient commitment
may be used.
130
At the present time the criteria for admission to one of the community
service treatment programs are (1) availability of space in the desired pro-
gram, (2) willingness of the patient to cooperate, and (3) adequate family
support to assure that alternative treatment was carried through by the
patient. Our observations and interviews show that these procedures lim-
ited the extent to which alternatives were explored in the court hearing and
128. See Appendix C.
129. S. Kirk, The Effect of a Community Commitment Law on Commitments to Hospi-
tals (unpublished paper at Dallas County Mental Health Mental Retardation Center, Dal-
las, Texas).
130. Had this same approach been attempted in 1973, prior to the passage of art. 5547-
38(c), the same facilities and supporting services would not have been available.
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utilized by the court. Since the Medical Diagnostic Center personnel
would not recommend those who contested their commitments for CSC
placement, and the judge was unwilling to order a patient into a program
in the face of staff opposition, contested cases resulted either in hospitaliza-
tion or dismissal.' 3' Twenty-five percent of the uncontested cases ended
up as CSC placements. None of the ninety-seven contested cases in our
survey ended in CSC placement, although four ended in dismissal with the
proviso that the patient seek voluntary treatment. Importantly, in these
four cases, no commitment was made to any program. In short, section
38(c) was not used in contested court cases during our observational pe-
riod.
An additional factor to be considered in evaluating the impact of section
38(c) is the national trend away from long-term institutional care and to-
ward the use of local treatment alternatives.132 This shift was spurred lo-
cally by the filing of a "right to treatment" lawsuit against a Texas state
mental hospital. 133 One response by the hospital to suits such as this was
an attempt to decrease the patient load and thereby improve staff-patient
ratios, which are frequently used as a benchmark for measuring treatment
efforts in such litigation. 34
One consequence of the trend away from long-term commitments is that
certain patients now have more frequent contacts with the judicial system
concerning their involuntary hospitalization. Previously these individuals
might have been committed to a single lengthy hospitalization; they may
now be subject to release and subsequent rehospitalization for shorter time
periods. Whether this process is more therapeutic, economical, or efficient
is beyond the scope of this study.
It must also be recognized that the procedural results accomplished by a
section 38(c) commitment in Dallas could have been accomplished prior to
the passage of section 38(c). Patients in Dallas County are never ordered
to utilize a particular alternative to hospitalization following a contested
hearing. Instead they must "volunteer." The purpose of a section 38(c)
commitment in these instances is to provide an additional incentive for the
patient to adhere to the treatment regime. This same effect could have
been accomplished before section 38(c) through an agreement with the pa-
131. See Appendix F. In order to check the representativeness of the data derived from
our courtroom observations, the data in Appendix F were compared to a quarterly report
from the Medical Diagnostic Center covering Apr. I to June 30, 1979. Although this time
period was not the same as our observations, the proportions of various dispositions were
comparable. For example, 57% of all cases from May 29, 1979, to Aug. 2, 1979, the period of
our observation, resulted in hospitalization of some type; in the Medical Diagnostic Center
report 55% of the cases resulted in hospitalization. Thirty-three percent of the cases ob-
served resulted in alternative community programs, compared to the Medical Diagnostic
Center report of 30%. We found 10% of cases dismissed, while Medical Diagnostic Center
data for the earlier period reported that 15% were dismissed.
132. Greenblatt & Glazier, The Phasing Out of Mental Hospitals in the United States, 132
AM. J. PSYCH. 1135, 1135 (1975).
133. See Jenkins v. Cowley, No. CA 3-74-394 (N.D. Tex., filed Dec. 10, 1974).
134. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modfled sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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tient to continue the proceedings for a finite time, with the understanding
that if the patient follows the prescribed regime, the case will be dis-
missed.'35 Although this approach might have proven problematic if a
subsequent attempt was made to commit such a patient in Dallas County,
unsuccessful section 38(c) commitments are handled as initial commit-
ments.'36 Thus, if unsuccessful continuances were also handled as initial
commitments, any problems concerning the absence of statutory authority
to permit a continuance under these circumstances could be overcome.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The most basic requirement for the use of less drastic alternatives is the
existence of alternatives. Far too frequently this summer we observed pa-
tients sent to the state hospital because a local alternative did not exist, and
not because the patient required the services of the state hospital. The first
priority in any attempt to utilize alternatives to state hospitalization must
therefore be the creation and funding of local alternatives to state hospital-
ization.' 37 This Article is not an appropriate forum to provide a shopping
list of mental health resources that particular communities require. Com-
prehensive health planning is best accomplished in other settings. Certain
general observations can be made, however. The absence of local, short-
term psychiatric hospitalization capacity in the rural counties we observed
often resulted in the immediate transfer from the community of residents
with behavioral problems. Perhaps a county that utilizes the civil commit-
ment process should be required, as the price of participating in the sys-
tem, to provide adequate local pre-hearing and short-term in-patient
psychiatric treatment facilities. Such a requirement might require that
135. For examples of this approach, see Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmerman, Adminis-
trative Civil Commitment.- The Ins and Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV.
266, 275 (1975); Wexler & Scoville, supra note 16, at 77.
136. This procedure avoids a serious due process problem since the statute makes no
provision for the procedures necessary to revoke an art. 5547-38(c) commitment. Accord,
Lewis v. Donahue, 437 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Meisel v. Kremens, 405 F. Supp.
1253 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Government of the United States ex rel. Shaban v. Essen, 386 F. Supp.
1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aj9'd, 516 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1975); ef. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (due process requires preliminary and final hearings for revocation of probation);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation required informal hearing and
other minimum due process safeguards).
137. It has been held that the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative requires not only
examination of existing alternatives, but also the duty to see that such alternative facilities
exist. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975). See also Morales v. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53, 125 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en banc) in which the court noted in its decision concerning the State of Texas's obligation
to investigate the least restrictive form of care of juveniles that:
The state may not circumvent the Constitution by simply refusing to create
any alternatives to incarceration; it must act affirmatively to foster such alter-
natives as now exist only in rudimentary form (foster homes, supervised pro-
bation and parole), and to build new programs suited to the needs of the
hundreds of its children that do not need institutional care (e.g., group homes,
halfway houses, day care programs, outpatient clinics, home placements with
close supervision). The Constitution of the United States and the laws of the
State of Texas require no less of the defendants.
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counties with populations in excess of a certain figure provide such a facil-
ity, while permitting cooperative ventures by smaller counties.
Another factor in the failure to utilize alternatives is the failure of key
personnel within the system to understand what alternatives exist and how
those alternatives might be effective in the treatment of mental illness.
Both judges and lawyers could benefit greatly from educational programs
dealing with mental disorder, its diagnosis, and the efficacy of various
forms of treatment, as well as with current developments in mental health
law. Knowledge of the alternatives does not insure their effective use,
however. Attorneys must be encouraged by the court to play an active role
in commitment proceedings. Attorneys must be given adequate notice of
the proceedings and reasonable compensation to justify thorough prepara-
tion of the case. Requiring the staff to make its recommendations earlier
in time would help accomplish this goal. One unfortunate consequence of
an early recommendation requirement is that the social workers, psycholo-
gists, and psychiatrists may be rushed in their preliminary preparation of
the case. One way to avoid this rush and to permit earlier recommenda-
tions would be to detain the proposed patient for a longer time prior to
hearing. In addition to the due process implications of such an increased
deprivation of liberty prior to a hearing, however, this pre-hearing detain-
ment would require the use of beds utilized for in-patient commitments.
Thus, a decision to require early notice involves a balancing of the reliabil-
ity of the initial commitment decision against the use of these same facili-
ties for post-commitment local hospitalization.
In addition to providing the time that mental health professionals re-
quire to perform their jobs properly, the mental health professionals must
also be made aware of treatment alternatives. Our interviews and observa-
tions revealed that many mental health professionals participating in the
civil commitment process were either unaware of existing alternatives or
simply failed to consider potentially viable alternatives. Several steps are
necessary to correct this problem. First, programs highlighting the existing
spectrum of traditional and nontraditional local mental health resources
should be conducted. In addition, mental health professionals must be en-
couraged to scrutinize more carefully their own recommendations and
those of their colleagues. Finally, the reasons for the recommendations of
these mental health professionals must be carefully explained at trial; the
supporting analysis and, in particular, the reason for excluding alternatives
must be described to the court.
In Dallas County the testifying psychiatrist is expected to address and
exclude the use of alternatives to hospitalization before commitment is or-
dered. This practice does not exist in Collin or Hunt Counties. Arguably,
the state may be required by constitutional principles to exclude the practi-
cality of alternatives to state hospitalization before the court may commit a
patient to the state hospital. 3 ' Lake v. Cameron,139 the first case to reach
138. See notes 13-24 supra and accompanying text.
139. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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this conclusion, involved the construction of a District of Columbia stat-
ute. The relevant portions of that statute, interpreted in 1966 to require the
government to exclude alternatives to hospitalization, provide: "the court
may order [the patient's] hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or
order any other alternative course of treatment which the court believes
will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."' 4 ° The lan-
guage chosen by the Texas Legislature for section 38(c) is so remarkably
similar' 4 ' to the language of the District of Columbia Code interpreted in
Lake, nine years prior to the passage of section 38(c), that it may be ar-
gued convincingly that the Texas Legislature intended to require the same
result in Texas as the District of Columbia Code required in Lake.
Moreover, if, as a matter of policy, the state wishes to encourage the use
of alternatives to state hospitalization, it must encourage the addressing of
these issues in court. This policy is too important to be left to local prac-
tice. If the practicality of less drastic alternatives is to be an issue, one of
the parties must be assigned the burden of production and persuasion on
this issue. An allocation of these evidentiary burdens to the state would
reflect a policy that state hospitalization should be used only after a finding
that no practical alternatives exist. Further, because of the state's access to
social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, it has greater access to in-
formation concerning the availability of alternatives and their appropriate-
ness in particular cases than has a prospective patient.'42 The Mental
Health Code should therefore be amended to require the state to address
and exclude alternatives to hospitalization as an element of its prima facie
case. The state should be required to meet the same standard of persua-
140. Id at 661.
141. "[T]he court may order the proposed patient to submit to other treatment, observa-
tion, or care as may be found by the court to be likely to promote the welfare or protection
of the proposed patient and the protection of others." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5547-38(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
142. Closely related to the state's greater access to information on the appropriateness of
particular alternatives is the patient's access to independent experts to evaluate and testify
on the appropriateness of particular alternatives. Given the court's reliance upon expert
testimony, the patient's ability to persuade the court that an alternative is appropriate will
likely turn on the patient's ability to produce favorable expert testimony. There is little
dispute that independent psychiatric examinations may lead to different conclusions than
those performed by the examining psychiatrist. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Pre-
sumption of Expertise." Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). Thus,
the mere fact that the state's psychiatrist concludes that alternatives are not appropriate in a
certain case does not mean that another competent psychiatrist would reach the same con-
clusion. Because it is the court, and not the psychiatrist, who must ultimately decide
whether state hospitalization, alternative care, or dismissal should be ordered, the patient's
access to an independent expert is crucial.
The typical civil commitment patient is indigent, thus often only a court-appointed and
court-paid expert will permit the patient access to expert testimony. Although this exact
issue has not been addressed in Texas, in the criminal context Texas courts have not found
the appointment of such an expert to be required by the Texas Constitution. Crain v. State,
394 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965). Other
jurisdictions, however, have required the appointment of independent experts in civil com-
mitment proceedings. E.g., In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 301 A.2d 493 (Somerset
County t. 1973). Even in the absence of a constitutional requirement, the legislature could
require the appointment of such experts to increase the use of alternatives to state hospitali-
zation and to reduce the courts' dependence on the state's psychiatrist.
1211
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sion it is required to meet to commit a patient, ie., by clear and convincing
evidence. 4
3
The passage of section 38(c) must not be viewed as the final battle for
mental health advocates. There is cogent evidence that a change in the law
can have a beneficial effect on the disposition of commitment cases. Yet
our study of its impact reinforces the conclusion that unless the alternative
mental health services exist and key people are aware of their existence
and efficacy, section 38(c) may be merely a hollow promise of community
mental health care.
143. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 180, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979).
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Appendix B
Court Disposition of Mental Illness Cases
by Year from 1974* to 1978 in Collin County
(Percentages in Parentheses)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Hospital Commitment for 90 days 20 16 13 9 13
(state or private) (91) (80) (82) (56) (57)
Order of Protective Custody 0 2 1 0 2() (10) (6) () (9)
Commitment to Alternative 0 0 0 i 0
Treatment (-) (-) (-) (6) (-)
Dismiss to Treatment 0 0 1 0 1
0- (6) 0- (4)
Dismissal 2 2 1 6 7
(9) (10) (6) (38) (30)
Total Cases* 22 20 16 16 23
* Records were not available due to lack of effective recording and retrieval methods for court
cases handled in 1973.
** The total sample was 100 cases. Three cases did not contain information on case disposition
and thus were excluded from the table.
Appendix C
Court Disposition of Mental Illness Cases
by Year from 1973 to 1978* in Dallas County
(Percentages in Parentheses)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Hospital Commitment for 90 days 25 25 26 18 14 18
(state or private) (52) (50) (54) (38) (29) (38)
Order of Protective Custody 0 0 0 0 2 0
0- 0- 0- 0- (4) (-
Commitment to Alternative 0 0 0 0 4 15
Treatment (-) (-) (-) (-) (1 8) (32)
Dismiss to Treatment 9 9 5 4 4 2(19) (18) (10) (8) (8) (4)
Dismissal 14 16 17 26 25 12
(29) (32) (36) (54) (51) (26)
Total Cases* 48 50 48 48 49 47
* The total sample was 298 cases. Eight cases did not contain information on case disposition
and thus were excluded from the table.
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Appendix D
Court Disposition of Mental Illness Cases
by Year from 1973 to 1978* in Hunt County
(Percentages in Parentheses)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Hospital Commitment for 90 days 26 15 15 22 15 18
(state or private) (96) (71) (66) (96) (54) (78)
Order of Protective Custody 0 0 4 1 4 0
0- (-) (17) (4) (14) 0-
Commitment to Alternative 0 0 0 0 0 0
Treatment (-) (-) () (-) (-) (-)
Dismiss to Treatment 0 1 0 0 0 00- (5) 0- 0- 0- 0-
Dismissal I 5 4 0 9 5
(4) (24) (17) (-) (32) (22)
Total Cases* 27 21 23 23 28 23
The total sample was 147 cases. Two cases did not contain information on case dispositions
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Appendix F
Court Disposition by Degree of Contesting Hospitalization
for Dallas County, Summer 1979
(Percentage in Parentheses)
Type of Case
Disposition Contested Cases Uncontested Cases Total
90-day Hospitalization 65 120 185
(TSH and private) (67.0) (37.4) (44.3)
Order of Protective Custody 16 11 27
(16.5) (3.4) (6.4)
Community Services 0 79 79
Commitment (-) (24.6) (18.9)
Dismiss for 4 34 38
Treatment Elsewhere (4.1) (10.6) (9.1)
Dismiss 6 27 33
(6.2) (8.4) (7.9)
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